Abstracts of Recent American Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
duty is simply that of an operative: _Farwell v. B. W. f..Railroad
Co., 4 Metc. 49; Gilman v. Eastern Railroad Co., supra; Zeifgler
v. Day, 123 Mass. 152; (I'spin v. Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516; Me-
Cosker v. L. I. Railroad Co., 84 Id. 77 ; Harvey v. Railroad Co.,
88 Id. 481; Slattery'8 Adm'r v. Railroad Co., 23 Ind. 81;
Moak Eng. Rep. 840, 842; Flynn v. Salem, 134 Mass. 851.
As it would seem, then, that there is nothing to take the station
agent in this instance out of the category of a prima facie fellow-
servant of the plaintiff, we are of opinion that the court below was
right in holding him to be such fellow-servant and dismissing the
action accordingly.
The order refusing a new trial is accordingly affirmed.
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ABATEMENT.
Actions for Penalties unaer Acts of Congress-Death of Defendant.-
At common law actions on penal statutes do not survive, and there is no
Act of Congress which establishes any other rule in respect to actions on
the penal statutes of the United States. The nature of penalties and
forfeitures imposed by Acts of Congress cannot be changed by state
laws, and therefore state statutes allowing suits on state penal statutes
to be prosecuted after the death of the offender, can have no effect on
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions.
The cases will probably appear in 110 U. S.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 41 Ark. Reports.
3 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 68 or
69 Georgia Reports.
' From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 31 Kansas Reports.
5 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Ohio St. Reports.
6 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 42 Ohio St. Reports.
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suits in the courts of the United States for the recovery of penalties
imposed by an Act of Congress: Schreiber v. Sharpless, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1883.
A ENT.
Powers of-Limited by scope of Enployment -Agency -How
proved.-It cannot be presumed, in the absence of evidence, that a
local station agent along the line of a railway company has any general
authority to contract for furnishing cars to shippers at other stations
than his own: Mo. Pac. Railway Co. v. Stats & Neiswender, 31 Kan.
. Agency cannot be proved by proof of the oral declarations of the
supposed agent himself: .d.
-Railway companies are not responsible for the declarations or admis-
sions of any of their servants beyond the immediate sphere of their
agency and during the transaction of the business in which they are
employed: Id.
APPEAL.
Final Decree, what not.-A decree in favor of the plaintiff for the
title and possession of land and improvements, and ordering a reference
to a master to ascertain the necessity and value of repairs put upon
them by the defendant, for which be claims compensation, is not a final
decree from which an appeal can be taken : Fitzpatrick v. Phillips, 41
Ark.
ARBITRATION.
Conclusiveness of Award-Merger of Claim in the Award.-An
award, though made upon a mere common-law arbitration, is prima
face conclusive between the parties as to all matters submitted to the
arbitrators, and such award is generally a bar to an action on the
original claim, and this notwithstanding defendant has failed to comply
with its requirements. Arbitrations ought to be encouraged, and an
award of arbitrators if unimpeached for fraud or mistake should be sus-
tained: Groat v. Pracht, 31 Kan.
Where the plaintiff's claim is simply for money due for materials and
labor on a building of the defendant, and it appears that the matters in
respect to such building were submitted to arbitrators who made an
award, that defendant give a check for a certain amount, surrender a
certain note, and receipt two accounts one against the plaintiff and one
against his father-in-law. Held, that whatever exceptions may exist to
the general doctrine of the merger of a claim in an award this is not
one, and that such award is a bar to an action on the original claim : 1d.
ASSIGNMENT. See Limitations, Statute of-
ATTACHMENT.
Esemption Lw no e-tra-territorial force-Debt of Garnishee to non-
resident bound by attachment though contracted out of State- Wages.-
The laws of a state, and in this are included its exemption laws, have no
extra-territorial force: Burlington & Mo. River Railroad v. Thompson,
31 Kan.
To garnishee proceedings in the courts of this state, it is no sufficient
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answer that the debt of the garnishee to the defendant is by the laws
of the state where both defendant and garnishee reside exempt from
seizure under such process : Id.
A foreign corporation coming into this state and leasing property and
doing business here may be garnished for a debt due to one of its
employees, although such employee is not a resident of this state and
although the debt was contracted outside of the state : Id.
Where at the time of service of garnishee process the defendant is
in the employ of the garnishee and continues thereafter in such employ-
ment, the garnishee proceedings bind onjy the amount due at the date
of the service of process and do not reach to amounts subsequently
earned, even under a prior contract of employment: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Negotiability of Note, not destroyed by waiver of Exemption, &d-
Pre.sumption that Endorsement without date was before Maturity and to
bonafide Holder.-The mere incorporation in a note otherwise negotiable
of a waiver of all relief from appraisement, stay, exemption and home-
stead laws, does not destroy its negotiability: Lyon v. Ifartin, 31 Kan.
Where a negotiable note appears properly endorsed by the payee and
the endorsement is without date, the presumption of law is that it was
so endorsed before maturity, and that the plaintiff in an action thereon
is a bonafide holder, and this presumption is not overthrown by matters
which at best do no more than create a suspicion ; as for instance that
the counsel of the plaintiff is also the counsel of the payee in other
actions, that the general collecting agent of the payee is a witness for
plaintiff on the trial, there being no showing as to how he came to be a
witness or that he was not regularly subpcenaed, or that the plaintiff
when he endorsed the note to a bank for collection waived protest both
for himself and the payee: Id.
Execution of Note by Person able to Read.-Evcidence-Comparison
of Handwriting-Note made to Fictitious Hirm.-Where a party in full
possession of all his faculties and able to read, though slowly and with
difficulty, signs a negotiable promissory note under the belief that
it is an instrument of a different character, and does so without himself
reading the instrument but relying on the reading and representations
of a stranger; held, that the execution of the note under these circum-
stances is such negligence on his part as will hold him- liable thereon
to a bona fide holder: Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan.
One who has for a considerable time been engaged in a business
which necessitates the frequent comparison of handwriting, and who
shows that he has been in fact in the habit of making such comparisons,
is qualified as an expert to testify as to the genuineness of a disputed
signature by comparison with others admitted to be genuine : Id.
Where a party executes a note to the order of a fictitious firm, and
thereafter the holder endorses the note in the firm's name, a bona fide
endorsee may recover against the maker and this notwithstanding the
latter was ignorant of the fact that the firm name was fictitious. Id.
Where the principal negligence charged against the defendant is tho
failure to read the instrument which he signed, when he had the
ability to read, proof of the latter fact is important, and a practical test
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by handing him certain instruments and asking him to read them before
the jury is both satisfactory and proper : Id.
Joint Note of .Husband and Wife-Necessity of Personal Demand-
Effect of Provision in Mortgage that all of a Series of Notes shall come
due on Default in Payment of One.-The joint note of husband and
wife is the valid obligation of the husband alone, although the wife is
not liable at law thereon: Mc Clelland v. Bishop, 42 Ohio St.
Where such a note is payable at a future time, but at no particular
place, and the husband After making the same, abandons his place of
residence, and deserts to some place unknown to the holders, which
they cannot after diligent inquiry ascertain, when it falls due, they are
excused from making a personal demand upon him : Id.
In such a ease, a personal demand on the wife, with due notice of
non-payment to the indorser, ip the exercise of due diligence, and the
indorser is liable, though there was no personal demand on the hus-
band: Id.
Where there is a series of-negotiable notes in the usua. form, for dis-
tinct sums of money, payable at distinct and specified times in the future,
with a mortgage to secure each, according to its tenor and effect, which
contains a stipulation that if default be made in the payment of any one,
"then each and all should fall due, and this mortgage to become abso-
lute as to all said notes remaining unpaid at the happening of such
default." Held, that such stipulation relates to the remedy by fore-
closure or other proceedings under the mortgage, and upon such default
the mortgage may be foreclosed for the whole debt. It is a stipulation
for the advantage of the mortgagee, and of full force as to a remedy on
the mortgage, but does not operate to vary or extinguish the obligations
expressed on the face of the notes themselves for general purposes : Id.
For the purpose of demand and notice to charge indorsers, such notes
are to be deemed as due according to their terms, irrespective of such
stipulation in the mortgage : Id.
CoNFLIcT or LAws. See Attachment.
CONTRACT.
Cnsideration-Pomise to Contribute to pay Indebtedness of Charity
not Binding.-The creation of a fund with which to pay an indebtedness
of an educational institution is not a sufficient consideration for a promise
to contribute its amount to that object : Johnson v. Trustees of Otterbein
University, S. C. Com. 40 Ohio St.
Therefore, where a party gave to an educational institution his note
for the sum of $100, payable three years after date, and stipulating
therein that the money was to be used exclusively to liquidate its then
existing indebtedness : held, that the same was without consideration : Id.
An authority in the charter of the institution providing that its trus-
tees "may procure funds for the endowment of professorships, the
erection of buildings * * * the purchase of lands * * * and for what-
ever may be necessary for the prosperity of the institution, and shall
faithfully apply what they shall receive by donation or otherwise to
these purposes; provided that all donations, bequests, &c., shall'be
applied in accordance with the designs expressed by the donors" does
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not convert the note above described and its acceptance into a case of
mutual promises, nor otherwise make it valid: Id.
7e Ohio Wesleyan Female College v. Love's Ex'rs, 16 Ohio St. 20,
cited and distinguished : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Cqypyrght.
Law not Embracing more than one Subject and Expressing same in
l'tle.-The constitution of a state provided that " no private or local
law which may be passed by the general assembly shall embrace more
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." An act, the
title of which was "An act to amend the charter of the Cairo & St.
Louis Railroad Company," legalized an election previously held, at which
the people voted in favor of a subscription to the stock of that company,
and granted authority to issue bonds in payment of such subscription.
Held, that this provision of the act was sufficiently covered by the title:
City of. Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. L. Railroad Co., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1883.
Power of Congress to make Treasury Notes a Legal Tender.-Con-
gress as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being expressly empowered
by the Constitution " to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and pro-
vide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,"
and " to borrow money on the credit of the United States," and " to coin
money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin ;" and being
clearly authorized, as incidental to the exercise of those great powers,
to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and to provide a
national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, treasury
notes, and national bank bills; and the power to make the notes of the
government a legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the
powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not
expressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution; it follows that
the impressing upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality
of being a legal tender in payment of private debts is "necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution
in the government of the United States." The expediency of issuing
such notes at any particular time, in war or in peace, is a political ques-
tion to be decided by Congress: Legal Tender Cases, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1883.
CONTRACT.
Stipulation for Release in Case of lnztrue Statement.-A stipula-
tion in a contract, made by parties uninfluenced by mis-representation
or fraud and with full knowledge, that one party shall be absolutely
released in case a statement made by the other shall be found to be not
in all respects true, is valid, and must be enforced, where it does not
affirmatively appear that the party making said statement, with reason,
believed it to be true: Peniston v. Ins. Co., S. C. Coin. 40 Ohio
St.
Agreement on Sufficient Consideration to pay Money to Third Person
can be Enforced by him.-An agreement made on a valid consideration
by one person with another, to pay money to a third, can be enforced by
the latter in his own name; and the facts that the instrument
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evidencing such agreement is under seal, and that such third person is
not named therein, do not affect the right to enforce it: Emmitt v.
Brophy, 42 Ohio St.
Where a bridge company, owning a toll bridge, sells it, under
authority of law (66 Ohio L. 22, 338), to the commissioners of a county
for a consideration, in money, paid to a controlling stockholder of the
company, who, to induce, and as part consideration of, the purchase,
gives his bond for the use and benefit of the county, conditioned, among
other things "to pay off all liens and debts, whether in judgment
or otherwise, existing against said bridge," a judgment creditor of
the company who had an execution lien upon the bridge at the date of
the bond, may recover the amount of his judgment thereon against the
obligor : Id.
' independent Covenant- Concurrent Conditions-Agreement as to Party
Wall.-Where one agreed to build a party wall resting half upon his own
land and half upon the land of an adjoining land owner, furnishing the
material and labor therefor, and such adjoining land owner agreed that
upon its completion he would pay one-half of the cost thereof, and should
own a joint interest therein and have the right to use it whenever he de-
sired to build upon his own land; and as the land of the adjoining owner
did not extend as far north as the wall, it was agreed that the party erecting
it should convey to him the small strip of land lying northward of where
his line terminated, such contract was absolute and not conditional; the
covenants therein were independent, and the breach of one did not
relieve from the obligation of another, therefore a conveyance by the
party building the wall was not a condition precedent to the enforcement
of his claim against the adjoining owner for his proportion of the cost
thereof: Ensign v. Sharp, 68 or 69 Ga.
In case of concurrent conditions, to be simultaneously performed, if
one party is ready and willing, and offers to perform, and the other will
not, the first is discharged from the performance of his Dart and may
maintain an action against the other : Id.
COPYRIGHT.
Photogra~phs-Constitutional Law.-Under article 1, sect. 8, of the
Constitution of the United States, empowering Congress to secure to
"authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries," the copyrighting of photographs, so far as they are
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author, can
properly be authorized; and they are such when the artst has posed
his subject and arranged the draperies, &c., so as to produce a distinct
effect: Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1883.
CORPORATION.
Designation of Agent in (ertificate filed to entitle Foreign Corporation
to do Business in a State.-The Constitution of Colorado provides that
11 n6 foreign corporation shall do any business in this state without one
or more known places of business, and an authorized agent or agents in
the same, upon whop process may be served." The statutes of the
state provide that "foreign corporations shall, before they are authorized
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or permitted to do any business in this state, make and file a certificate
* * * designating the principal place where the business of such cor
poration shall be carried on in this state, and an authorized agent or
agents in this state, residing at its principal place of business, upon
whom process may be served." A certificate was filed, stating "that
the general manager of said corporation, residing at the said principal
place of business, is the agent upon whom process may be served."
Reld, that the designation of the "general manager" was sufficient,
without specifying the person who happened, at the date of the certifi-
cate, to fill that position: Goodwin v. Colorado Mortgage Co., S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1883.
Issue of Stock beyond the Charter Limit-Action on Subscription to
such Stock.-Where a corporation, incorporated under the laws of Ala-
bama, was only authorized by its charter to issue stock to the amount
of $100,000, when stock to that amount had been issued its charter
power was exhausted; and stock issued beyond that amount was ultra
vires and void, and a subscription therefor could not be collected by the
corporation, or by the assignees thereof occupying the place of such cor-
poration : Clark v. Trner, 68 or 69 Ga.
If one who subscribed to the stock of an insurance company, after its
charter power of issuing stock had been exhausted, induced insurance
on the part of any other person, in that company, by his acts as trustee
or agent thereof, or on the faith of his subscription, an individual action
on the part of the person so induced would lie against him, but not an
action by the company or its assignee for his subscription: Id.
EJECTMENT.
Title from Common Source-Presumption of Priority.-Where the
source of title is identical, and the parties have no other title to rely on,
neither party can go behind the person from whom they hold, or show
that his claim is not good : Stafford et al. v. Watson, 41 Ark.
Where a complaint in ejectment alleges that the defendant claims
title by mesne conveyance from the plaintiff's grantor, and the answer
admits that the defendant has no source of title beyond the common
grantor, it will be presumed, in the absence of allegation and proof to




Review of Judgments of State Court in United States Supreme Court.
-In order to make a judgment of a state court reviewable in the United
States Supreme Court on a federal question, it must unmistakably appear
that the court below either knew, or ought to have known, that such a
question was involved in the decision to be made. That the federal
question was suggested on a petition for a rehearing, is insufficient; as
the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court extends only to a
review of the judgment as it stands in the record, and they cannot incor-
porate into the record any new matter which appears for the first time
after the judgment on a petition for a rehearing : Susquehanna Boom
Co. v. W. Branch Boom Co., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
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EVIDENCE. See Bills and N'otes.
EXECUTION. See Moertgage.
EXEMPTION. See Attachment.
EXPERT. See Bills and Notes.
HOMESTEAD.
Tenant in Commonv and his Widow and Heirs entitled to.-A tenant
in common is entitled to a homestead, exempt from execution, in the
common estate, and on his death the right descends to his widow and
heirs: Ward v. Mayfield, 41 Ark.
INFANT. See Negligence.
LIBEL.
Statements made in Good Faith as to Character of Candidates for
Public Office Privileged.-In a criminal prosecution fbr libel, evidence
was introduced tending to show that the defendant, who was an elector
of Chase county,, Kansas, circulated an article among the voters of such
county containing some things that were untrue and derogatory to the
character of the prosecuting witness, who was then a candidate for
the office of county attorney of said county. Held, that if the supposed
libellous article was circulated among the voters of Chase county, and
only for the purpose of giving what the defendant believed to be truth-
ful information, and only for the purpose of enabling such voters to
cast their ballots more intelligently, and the whole thing was done in
good faith, such article was privileged and the defendant should be
acquitted, although the principal matter contained in the article may
have been untrue, in fact, and derogatory to the character of the prose-
cuting witness : State v. Balch, 31 Kan.
* LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Municipal Corporation subject to.-T.lunicipal corporations are bound
as individuals are, by the Statute of Limitations; and an adverse pos-
session of an alley in a city for the statutory period, wifl give title to
the occupant and bar the city: City of Fort Smith v. AlKibbin, 41
Ark.
Bar of by reason of Infancy-Burden of .Proof-When the Statute
of Limitations is pleaded, and adverse possession for the period of the
statutory bar is shown in an action of ejectment brought by one who has
recently attained to majority, the burden is on him to prove that the
action was commenced within three years from his majority: Yell v.
Lane, 41 Ark.
Payment on account by Assignee for Benefit of Creditors when suf-
ficient to bar.-Where the maker of a note thereafter made an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, and in such assignment scheduled this
note, and directed his assignee to convert the assigned property into
money and pay his debts, and in pursuance thereof the assignee took
possession and convkted said property into money, and applied the same
in part payment of the assignor's debts, this note among the number,
VOL. XXXIL-44
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Held, that the payment being one made in pursuance of express
directions from the assignor, for his benefit, and out of the proceeds of
his property, is such a payment as, under sect. 24 of the code, avoids the
bar of the Statute of Limitations; and this notwithstanding the pro-
ceedings under the assignment are controlled by the provisions of a
general statute concerning assignments for the benefit of creditors:
Letson v. Kenyon, 81 Kan.
MANDAMUS.
When it lies against a Public Officer.-Where a public officer is
called upon to perform a plain and specific public duty positively re-
quired by law, ministerial in its nature, calling for the use of no dis-
cretion, nor the exercise of official judgment, his performance of such
duty may, upon his refusal and in. the absence of other means of
relief, he enforced by mandamus: State ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 42
Ohio St.
When such officer, in determining upon the performance of a public
duty, is called upon to use official judgment and discretion, his exercise
of them, in the absence of fraud, bad faith and abuse of discretion, will
not be controlled or directed by mandamus : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Railroad.
Accident on account of known Defect - Negliqence.-Where the step
of a railroad engine is slightly defective, and the conductor of the train
has full knowledge of the condition of such step, and continues to use
it, he cannot recover dainages from the railroad company for injuries,
claimed to have resulted from the defective condition of the step, re-
ceived by him while using it: Jackson v. Railroad Co., 31 Kan.
The reversal of an engine in switching and in making up trains, is
not negligence per se, and negligence is never presumed without proof;
but in all cases must be proved: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Chattel Mortgage-What Designation of Articles .Necessary.-A
mortgage of a specified number of articles out of a larger number, will
not be good against creditors of the mortgagor and others acquiring
adverse rights, unless it furnishes the data for separating the mortgaged
part from the mass : Dodds v. Neel, 41 Ark.
In 1879 N. conveyed to B. a farm for $5610, payable in six equal
annual instalments. B. then conveyed the land and ten bales of each
annual crop of cotton to be produced on it for the six years, to a trustee
to secure the payments, with power to take possession and sell on default
of payment. In 1881 N. took possession of ten bales, including three
made by a tenant to B., to pay the instalment for that year. The ten-
ant had mortgaged his whole crop of that year to D. for supplies. Held,
That the first mortgage was void for uncertainty as against D., the sec-
ond mortgagee, and he could maintain replevin against N. for the three
bales : Id.
Chattel Mortgage-Lien of when not properly filed-Private Sale of
Chattel by Sheriff.-H. held a chattel mortgage An P. on a quantity
of growing wheat. The mortgage was not filed with the clerk of the
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township where P. resided. S. and others, judgment creditors of P.,
caused executions to be levied upon the wheat, knowing that H. had a
chattel mortgage thereon. The sheriff who held the wheat under his
levies, after it was harvested and threshed, agreed with C. to sell it to
him, to be paid for in cash on delivery: and afterward delivered it to
C. in pursuance of his agreement. The sale by the sheriff was made
with the consent and at the request of the execution creditors; but
without an order from the court or a judge thereof to sell af private
sale, and, on the day of delivery, before 0. had paid for the wheat, H.
seized it in replevin under a provision in his mortgage. Held, 1. That
the lien created by the levies was superior to the lien of the mortgage.
2. That the delivery of the wheat to 0. by the sheriff under his agree-
ment to sell, was not an abandonm~nt of the levies: Houk- v. Con1ton,
S. 0. Com. 40 Ohio St.
What is-Legal Title remains in .Mortgagor.-The owner in fee of
real estate conveyed the same to a trustee to secure a debt to a third
person. After the granting clause to a trustee in fee, there was a con-
dition that if the debt was paid at maturity the conveyance was to be void,
otherwise the trustee was authorized to sell the land at public sale to pay
the same. Held, 1. This conveyance was a deed of trust in the nature of
a mortgage, and not an absolute conveyance in trust to secure the debt.
2. The legal title remains in the grantor or mortgagor in possession
after default, subject to the right of the trustee or creditor to enforce
the condition of the mortgage. 3. The fact that the conveyance is to a
trustee, with power of sale in case of default, does not change its char-
acter in this respect. 4. A judgment against the grantor who remains
in possession of the premises with the acquiescence of the mortgagee,
ifter default, is a lien on said premises subject to such mortgage:
Martin v. Alter) 42 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Limitations, ,Statute of.
Bonds of-Necessity of Signature of Clerk without discretion to with-
hold it when required by Statute.-A statute of the state of Kansas
directed county commissioners of a county (when the electors of a town-
ship in the county should have determined, in the manner provided in
the act, to issue bonds in payment of a subscription to railway stock) to
order the county clerk to make the subscription, and to cause the bonds
to be issued in the name of the township, signed by the chairman of the
board and attested by the clerk under the seal of the county. Held,
that the signature of the clerk was essential to the valid execution of
the bonds, even though he had no discretion to withhold it: Bissell v.
.pring Valley Township, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
Liability for Bridge over Ditch in ffighway.-If a municipal corpora-
tion does not use ordinary care and diligence to make or keep a bridge
over a ditch in one of its highways, whether constructed by it or not, a
safe and convenient crossing for those using it as a passage over the
ditch both by day and night, it would be chargeable with negligence and
liable for whatever damages may be sustained in consequence thereof:
Town, of Belton v. Vinton, 68 or 69 Ga.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
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OFFICER.
Authority of one Executing Distress Warrant to receive Partial Pay.
ment.-Where a distress warrant was sued out and placed in the hands
of a levying officer, he was authorized and commanded to collect it, and
his authority to collect the whole included authority to collect a part of
the amount. A partial payment to him discharged the defendant pro
tanto, and the plaintiff must look to the officer for the amount so paid:
White v: Mandeville, 68 or 69 Ga.
PENALTY. See Abatement.
PLEADING.
Default only admits Allegations of Complaint.-A default after due
service of summons admits only the allegations of the complaint, and if
they are insufficient to support the judgment it will be reversed : C affin
et al. v. McFadden, 41 Ark.
PRESUM rION.
As to Note found among Effects of Deceased Debtor.-A promissory
note having been produced from among the effects of a deceased debtor
by his administrator, the presumption was that it had been paid, and the
onus was on the party asserting the contrary to show it: Liddell, Adm.,
v. Wright, Adm., 68 or 69 Ga.
RAILROAD. See Agent.
Liability for Neglgence of Road .faster.-A road master of a railroad
company, upon whom is imposed the duty of directing the repairs of the
road and keeping the road in safe condition, is, in the line of his duty,
the representative of the master-the representative of. the company:
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad v. Moore, 31 Kan.
Where the road master of a railroad company, whose duty it is to
direct repairs and keep the road in safe condition, is culpably negligent
in the performance of his duty, the railroad company even under the
rule of the common law is liable for the damages resulting from such
negligence to one of its other servants or employees : Id.
Liability for Injury to Mtinor assisting his Father.-Where an em-
ployee of a railroad company, rightfully engaged in the repair of a freight
car belonging to his employer, calls upon his son, a minor under eleven
years of age, to render him necessary temporary assistance in the work,
and the son while so assisting, without any negligence on his part or on
the part of his father, is injured through the negligence of the agents
and servants of another railroad company, in backing a train of cars upon
a side track where the car is being repaired, the latter company is liable
in an action by the son, for damages for the injury by him so received:
The Penna. Co. v. Gallagher, S. C. Com. 40 Ohio St.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Criminal Prosecution- When Jurisdiction of State Court Ceases.-
Where a prosecution in a state court is duly removed to the circuit court
of the United States, and the jurisdiction of that court attaches, the
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subsequent action of the state court in forfeiting the recognisance of the
defendant for his non-appearance is coram non judice and void; but
where the case was never duly removed, and it was dismissed from the
United States court on the ground that that court had no jurisdiction
of the case, a forfeiture of the recognisance for non-appearance in the
state court would be good. Before the jurisdiction of the state court
will cease in such cases, the jurisdiction of the United States court
must attach; and where the jurisdiction of the latter court never
attached, that of the former was never lost: Hunter v. Colquitt, 68 or
69 Ga.
Suits founded on Contract in favor of an Assignee.-Sect. 1, Ch. 137,
Act of March 3d 1875, confers upon circuit courts of the United States
original jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of different states,
or citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects, where the
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of $500, and
further provides as follows: "Nor shall any circuit or district court
have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an assignee,
unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon
if no assignment had been made, except in cases of promissory notes,
negotiable by the law merchant and bills of exchange." Section 2 of
that act authorizes the removal of similar causes as to parties and
amounts from state courts to circuit courts of the United States, but
without imposing the restriction as to assignees and assignments. Reid,
that the restriction upon the commencement of suits contained in section
1 does not apply to the removal of suits under section 2: Claflin v.
Conmonwealth Insurance Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
SALE.
Necessity of Tender before Action for Breach of Contract of.-
Where W. contracts with T. to sell to T. a safe in the possession and
under the control of L., and contracts that L. shall deliver the same to
T., and T. agrees that upon delivery thereof he will pay $15, and L.
rgfuses absolutely to deliver the safe: Reid, that T. may at once, and
without a tender of the $15, commence an action against W. for the
damage sustained by T. on account of the failure and refusal of L. to
deliver the safe : Thompson v. Warner, 31 Kan.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Part Performance must be in Lffe of Vendor.-Part performance of
a parol contract for the sale of land must be made in the life of the
vendor or it will not bind his infant heirs: Shirey v. Cumberhouse, 41
Ark..
STATUTE.
Repeal by lmjlication.-Repeals by implication are not favored. To
produce suc.h result the two acts must be upon the same subject and
there must be a plain repugnancy between their provisions; in which
case, to the extent of the repugnancy, the latter act repeals the former.
Or., if the two acts are not in express terms repugnant, then the later
act must cover the whole subject of the first and embrace new provisions
plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first: Coats
v. Hill, 41 Ark.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TAX AND TAXATION.
Distinction between Tax and Assessment-Exemption from Taxation
does not Exempt from Assessrnents.-In a general sense, a tax is an
assessment and an assessment is a tax ; but there is a well recognised
distinction between them, an assessment being confined to local imposi-
tions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements
in its immediate vicinity, and levied with reference to special benefits to
the property assessed: City of Lima v. Lima Cemetery Association, 42
Ohio.
A municipal corporation insisting on the right to- impose an assess-
ment, should be able to show that such power has been clearly granted
to it by statute; but authority being shown, in general terms, to make
the assessment, whoever insists that his property is exempted from the
burden, will be required to support his claim by a provision equally
clear: Id.
An incorporated cemetery association is not relieved from an assess-
ment for a street improvement by a statutory provision exempting its
lands from taxation, such exemption being regarded as confined to taxes
as distinguished from local assessments: id.
While the lands of an incorporated cemetery association, so far as
exempted, cannot be sold to pay an assessment for the improvement of
a street, the municipal corporation may enforce the assessment by such
remedies as the statute and courts of equity afford: Id.
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Not Insurer- What sufficient proof of Negligence.-Telegraph com-
panies are not insurers, and do not guarantee the delivery of all mes-
sages with entire accuracy and against all contingencies, but they do
undertake for ordinary care and vigilance in the performance of their
duties and to answer for the neglect and omission of duty of their
servants and agents: Little Rock & Fort Smith Telegraph Co. v. Davis,
41 Ark.
When it is proved that the agent of a telegraph company received a
message and failed to deliver it, and there is no proof to account for oi
excuse the negligence, it may be assumed to have been intentional on
the part of the agent or a gross disregard of duty : Id
TRUSTEE.
Contract of- When personally liable on-" Current Expenses."-Real
estate and personal property were held in trust by two trustees. One
trustee at the request of the other and of a third person resigned his
trust without requiring previous payment of' his demands against the
trust estate, and the third person was appointed trustee in his place. The
two trustees then executed a written agreement with the outgoing
trustee, undertaking to apply to the payment of his said claims " all the
moneys which shall come into our hands as trustees as aforesaid after
first paying therefrom all taxes and current expenses of said property
and trust :" fHeld, that this was a contract to be enforced at law, against
the parties individually, and not a trust to be enforced in a court
of equity; and that the current expenses of the trust did not include
the construction of fire-proof buildings and unusual expenditures for
protecting the property: Taylor v. Davis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Equity; Errors and Appeals.
furdiction-Power to prevent abuse ofits own Process-C0itizenship.-
Goods claimed by a third person having been seized on a writ of attach.
ment issued by A. against B., in the United States court, and the remedy
which the third person would have in the state courts by way of a writ
of replevin against the officer executing such a process, not existing
against the United States marshal, Held, that the United States court
would, on a bill filed by the claimant, grant him full relief, although he
was a stranger to the original suit and the citizenship of the parties to the
bill was not such as would be necessary to give the United States court
jurisdiction in an original proceeding: Erzitpendorf v. Hyde, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1883.
Usuny. See Equity.
E.ffect of Novation.-An insurance company made a loan of money to
W., and took from him his promissory note for the amount thereof, with
interest at eight per cent. per annum, secured by mortgage on real estate,
and took his sundry other notes for usurious interest on the loan. W.
afterwards sold and conveyed the property to B., who, as part of the
consideration, agreed to pay the notes and mottgage given by W., and,
to secure the performance of his agreement, executed to W. a mortgage
on the same property. B. sold and conveyed the property in fee to J.,
and made to him a warranty deed thereof, and agreed with him to pay
off the incumbrances thereon. Held, that in an action of foreclosure by
the insurance company, the defence of usury is not available to J-.
against the mortgage given by W. to the company: Jones v. Franklin
Ins. Co., S. C. Com. 40 Ohio St.
WftL.
Differenee between Deed and Testament.-The test whether a written
instrument is a deed or is testamentary in its character is this: If the
title vests eo instanti at the execution of the paper, it is a deed but if
the same is not to take effect until the death of the maker, it is a testa-
ment: Ward v. Campbell, 68 or 69 Ga.
Election-Parol Evidence as to.-William Hubbard's will contained
the following devise : "I give and bequeath to my brother Edward L.
Hubbard, the full amount of his indebtedness to me, and the remainder
of my property both real and personal to my sister Mrs. Sarah L. Fitz-
hugh." This debt, amounting to $4200 dollars, evidenced by note and
secured by deed of trust on property, had in fact been transferred by the
testator to Mrs. Fitzhugh eight months before the execution of the will,
and Edward L. was not then indebted to him at all, and after his death
she ittempted to collect the debt. Held, that she should elect whether
she would affirm the will and accept the devise to her, or renounce the
same and hold the debt: Fitzhuyh and Wife v. Hubbard, 41 Ark.
In the construction of wills parol evidence is admissible to show the
condition of the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, so as
to place the court in the position of the testator; but his purpose to put
the devisee to his election must appear from the will itself. Id.
